Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented): Stepped Up Course B (Operation Mongoose)

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OSD

LANSDALE, EDWARD G.

THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)
STEPPED UP COURSE B

08/08/62

26

OPERATION MONGOOSE

LANSDALE, EDWARD G.
COVERT OPERATIONS

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
TOP SECRET

1c

OPEN

06/23/98

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUR ALIGN NTED) ew
| 0 Retain ciass’n 4 e ant g eSeeT,

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Deciassify with concurjefce of
° | / EO 12958, 25x 4% —_ 2C6/G7
FPC/HDR by {age Date:

Subject: Stepped Up Course B

WithdrawaiN

You requested a paper on "a possible stepped up Course B as mo
to. content, implication. and difference from present course of _
action.
Course B was described in our 25 July team review of Opera- on
tion Mongoose, as a course of action possible under present U.S. 8 ~
policy. It read: "b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, Bt &
psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Com- S o ry
munist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military."' The ages
major difference from Phase I of Operation Mongoose would be in = 3 '
removing the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines , which OM &
kept our actions ''short of those reasonably calculated to ins pire << 2 3
a revolt within the target area." i oo
67 &
As a practical way of getting a meaningful paper to you, for 5 is 5
consideration prior to the policy meeting, I held working sessions ZO BS
with the Operational Representatives: Mr. Hurwitch (State), Gen. = Bg
On;

Harris (Defense), Mr. Harvey (CIA), and Mr. Wilson (USIA). After
benefit of discussion, each was tasked with writing a specific
section of this paper. The thinking reflects those of responsible
representatives, rather than completely staffed positions from

participating departments iand agencies.

The papers from each representative are attached. The major
contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in
a stepped up Course B. The State, Defense, and USIA papers are
essentially reflective of companion roles to CIA's covert activities.
USIA has added a "think piece'' on anticipated world-wide psychologi-

cal Fe reaction to a stepped up Course B.

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Considerations

In our Operational Representatives discussions, it was generally
acknowledged that a widespread revolt of the Cuban people against the
regime might well lead to an open appeal by Cubans for help by U.S.
military forces, as the regime's security forces attempt to crush the
revolt. The CIA operational people, who would implement a stepped
up Course B as Phase II of. Operation Mongoose, do not believe this

' course of action by itself would bring the overthrow of the regime in
Cuba; they believe that the use of U.S. military force in the final stage
must be anticipated, for success.

At the close of the attached CIA section on."'covert activities,"
there is a list of policy approvals deemed required. It is suggested
that this be read in context with the CIA operational suggestions as
outlined in the section. It is noted that authority would be required
for overflights (resupply, leaflet drops, infiltration, exfiltration), use
of U.S. submarines for infiltration and exfiltration, major sabotage
operations, stepped up psychological actions (including propaganda
balloons and establishing a medium-wave Radio Free Cuba), training
Cubans on U.S. bases, some operational use of Guantanamo, and
more flexibility in the composition of paramilitary groups (selection
of Cubans in U.S. forces. and strengthening with non-Cubans).

In the ''covert activities" section, it is noted that CIA would sup-
port State in any feasible action to develop individual Latin American
country support and would provide covert support to the CRC and appropriate

Cuban groups, to assist in the achievement of the goal of Operation Mongoose. 7
My own comment is to urge that you give the fullest possible con- é \
sideration to the concept of actions by Cuban groups, and actions from \
and by Latin American countries, to achieve the goal of Operation '. ¥
Mongoose. Consideration of this concept is urged, since it alone } e
could offer making the responsibility for initiative and actions reside in ¢?
groups and countries other than the U.S. Ifa support concept is Ve
possible which would permit U.S. assets to assist such non-U.S. vp

operations, with reasonable assurance of mutual objectives and methods,
then this would be the most desirable concept for winning our goal.

Attachments

2

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"Special Handling'' numbered copies to:

Special Group (Series A)

1. General Taylor
2. Mr. Johnson
3. Mr. Gilpatric

Added (Series B)

l. Mr. Bundy
2. Mr. Rusk

Operational Representatives (Series B)

Mr. Hurwitch (State)

Mr. Harvey (CIA)

5
6
7
8. Mr. Wilson (USIA)
9

. General Harris (Defense

/10 Chief of Operations

3

au fb

Mr. McCone
Mr. Kennedy
General Lamnitzér

Mr. McNamara
Mr. Murrow

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7 August 1962

wane

COVERT ACTIVITIES

-

William K. Harvey, CIA Representative for Operation Mongoose,
states:

I. SITUATION:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action which would
be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to fully implement
course of action 'b" in General Lansdale's memorandum to the Special
Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962.

B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is
contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62.

C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are
made:

1. Conclusion. #D of the National Intelligence Estimate
85-2-62 is invalid. (This assumption is not in our opinion
valid, but this operational plan is not a valid plan for the
overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless this
assumption is made.)

2. Soviet troops will not be present in Cuba in force.

3. Passive resistance can be changed to active resistance
through aggressive, provocative propaganda plus aggressive
small-scale open resistance and through fortuituous circum-
stances existing at the time. It cannot be manipulated ona
"time table" basis.

II. MISSION:

!
"Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other
. pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt
U.S. military commitment"

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LYUHTAOD

Ill. TASKS:
A. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop
active OAS and individual Latin American country support for the
overthrow of Castro.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts,
leaders, and political groups.

3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban
political groups as appropriate.

4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban
government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

5. Induce the population to engage in militant mass action
such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work. stoppages, and
s abotage.

B. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and .
execution.

2. Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban
industries and public utilities with priority attention being given
to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities.
No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical
facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. At
the present time, and for the predictable future, major sabotage
at least in part probably would have to be conducted by raider
type teams using hit and run tactics.

3. By aggressive deception and other operations, cause the
diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.

4. Induce the population to conduct continuing widespread
minor acts of sabotage.

C. Resistance:

1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and
revolt in the general population.

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2. Recruit, train, and supply small clandestine resistance
cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.

3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in maximum
feasible amounts, in areas accessible to the resistance cells and

in potential resistance areas.

4. Be prepared to provide covert liaison and communications
with leadership elements to any significant internal uprising.

5. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics
support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

6. Harass local elements of the Cuban government by hit and
run raids against selected targets such as local G-2 offices, militia
posts, telephone centrals, etc.

7. If feasible and authorized, initiate an internal uprising.

D. Psychological:

1. Strengthen, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban
people to resist Castro-Communism.

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere,
and elsewhere.

od

E. Intelligence:

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with
particular emphasis on the following:

a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
c. Soviet activities in Cuba.

d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the
population.

e. Militia morale.

f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the
"power centers" in the Cuban government.

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IV. IMPLEMENTATION:

To undertake the above listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop
and carry out the following program (which constitutes a substantial expan-
sion of the current program, particularly in fields other than intelligence).

A. Intelligence (FI):

The current build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified
and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The follow-
ing types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans
in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and
maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more
critical as police state controls increase.

2. Spotting/ recruiting /training of third country nationals
resident in Cuba.

3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have
potential access to significant information.

4. Expansion of communications intelligence, particularly
in thelG-2, police, and militia nets] (This is primarily an NSA
problem. )

B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban
population. It will have to provide aggressive and provocative
propaganda as well as the milder themes. Clear authority to engage
in "high noise level" types of propaganda operations calling for work
stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass
action and widespread overt resistance is required.

The following psychological warfare activities are considered
essential:

44

1. The establishment of a sufficiently powerful Radio Free Cuba
located in Southern Florida or other appropriate area. When this is in
operation, the Swan Island operation will be terminated. Policy
approval to establish this is required.

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2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and
appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching
operations.

3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet
dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.
_4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio
transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval
is required.

5. Continuation and expansion of the "Voice of Cuba" submarine
broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.

6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations
infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers,
or couriers.

7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional,
cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting
their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba..

C. Paramilitary:

To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited.
Experience plus continually tightening security controls has
demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining "black
teams" in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any
method yet been devised by which infiltrated "black teams" can be
effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the
PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting,
recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the
original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological
warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and
will provide "the spark of hope.'"' Without this, it will be impossible
to recruit and train the necessary legal residents. .

To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and
support is considered essential:

1. Commando/Raider Teams - Ten to fifteen such teams of
approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral
caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and
run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen
these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when
an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either

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as a diversionary effort or for augmentation of selected pockets of
resistance. These teams should be trained primarily for hit and run

. commando raids. It is believed specialized Marine Corps training -
would be especially appropriate for them. If this is not possible,
then Army Ranger type training should be given. It is estimated
that ten to fifteen 12 to 15 man teams would be the maximum that
could be recruited, trained and utilized during the foreseeable
period. They should have a minimum of four-months training , for
‘which Department of Defense facilities and instructor personnel are
required. [Policy approval is required for the use of non-Cuban
contract personnel and DOD facilities and personnel -]

2. Urban Resistance Cells - Two to five man teams equipped
with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major
Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented
resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated
team will be withdrawn if endangered or if its continued presence
jeopardizes the "legal" residents. Initially these cells should be
intelligence producers with the secondary mission of selecting,
casing, and formulating plans for sabotage of key targets. (The
sabotage to be done either by other individuals or at the time of any
major uprising). A third mission would be to establish small
caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of major uprising.
It is estimated that within a year at least twelve urban cells could
be established. At least 25% of these probably will be lost due to
enemy counteraction or from other causes.. Spotting, recruiting,
and training of the teams to infiltrate can be accomplished within
Agency facilities and existing policy approvals. .

3. Rural Resistance Cells - Three to five man teams equipped
with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas
to recruit, train, and arm small "legal'' compartmented resistance
cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are endangered
or pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These
resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until
called into action in the event of an uprising. It is.estimated that
twelve to fifteen such teams could be in place within a year. Forces
lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%. Selection and training of
the infiltration teams can be accomplished by Agency facilities, but
they should be augmented with DOD Special Forces instructors.

4. Guerrilla - Five to eight man teams equipped with W/T
communications would be infiltrated into rural areas to live black,

6

:

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recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) "hit and run" guerrilla
bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both
maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psy-
chological warfare program in support of this effort must be
aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the
guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups
of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict

what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears
probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four
months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special
Forces instructors. The trainees could.be handled in groups of
fifty with two groups in training at a given time.

5. Cuban Exile Forces - The recruitment and training of
Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the
maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements

| should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups

| to permit the formation of a 'Cuban Freedom Fight" under responsible
exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant

) internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel

/ should be permitted within the ''Cuban Freedom Fighter" groups.
Additional Policy approval is required.

6. Infiltration/Exfiltration - The increased Cuban defensive
capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program
_requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration
tactics as required, including: ,

a. Present and planned commercial/private maritime
capability.

b. Submarines and other naval craft.

c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews and
aircraft.

Additional policy approval is required.

FOP SECRET

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Vv. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

A. From Department of Defense:

‘1. Ground Support: Three separate training facilities
-including all instruction and support.

_a. Site A - commando/raider training

Provide a four-month training course on a repetitive
‘basis for approximately 100 men.

b. Site B - Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis.
Fifty men per course. .

c. Site C - Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis.
Fifty men per course.

2. Naval Support:

a. [Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions.) Estimate
maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten
per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement
could be substantially higher. .

.b. Submarine radio broadcasts - "Voice of Free Cuba"

c. Naval surface craft support may be required at a
later date but cannot be predicted now.

d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity to
Boca Chica Naval Air Station.

~~

-@. [Use of Guantanamo Naval Basel for operational purposes, G) bos
including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for ‘ “)
clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance,

and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects.

3. Air Support:

a. Use of USAF crews and|sterile aircraft in lieu of or to
supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft

-FOP- SECRET

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for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially
estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by

January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could sub-
stantially increase.

b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements.

4. Personnel:
Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to
provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized

support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide
ay
communications support.

B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. POLICY APPROVALS REQUIRED:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing
program: ,

A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare
operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage,
and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance.

B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave transmitter by
Radio Free Cuba. ,,. 7”

C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching. A
D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.

E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeted against
Cuban industry and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, trans-
portation, and communications.

F. Authority to uselU. S. Navy submarines] for infiltration/exfiltration. Lo

G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams
being infiltrated. -

FOP SECREF

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©

H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using
DOD instructors and support facilities.

I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltra -
tion missions using U.S. contract air crewsler USAF crews,]

J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men
from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored
group of ''Cuban Freedom Fighters."'

_ K. Authority to utilize| Guantanamo Naval Basel for operational G M3)
purposes.

VIL. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Opera- |
tion Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.

B. Estimated Budget:
Fiscal Year 1963 - $40,000, 000
Fiscal Year 1964 - $60,000,000 (exclusive of reimburse -

_ ment for DOD suppo?t which it is felt
should be on a non-reimbursable basis. )

10

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7 August 1962

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

Robert A. Hurwitch, Department of State Representative for
Operation Mongoose, states:

It should be recognized at the outset that short of the employment
of U.S. military force the programs and actions of the U.S. aimed at
the downfall of the Castro Government will probably be only marginal
as compared to the policies and actions of the Castro Government
itself and those of the USSR. Despite the preponderance of power
presently at the disposal of the Castro Government, however, the
deteriorating and mis-managed Cuban economy coupled with a
generally discontented and volatile people whose lives are becoming
increasingly regimented provide some of the ingredients of an
uprising against the regime. U.S. actions may in this unstable situa-
tion provide the necessary spark; they may not. Since there are no
scientific means of determining which actions offer assurances of
success, we can only probe and experiment. In so doing, however,
we should avoid engaging U.S. prestige openly ‘maperations, the
success of which may be doubtful.

The present course of action with respect to Cuba involves the
exercise of all feasible political, economic. and psychological pres -
sures, as well as limited covert activities within Cuba, designed to
make the Castro Government's survival more difficult and to isolate
Cuba from the Hemisphere, thereby detracting from its value to the
Sino -Soviet Bloc, and reducing its capability to threaten the peace
and security of the Hemisphere. This course of action has undoubtedly
contributed to an advance toward these objectives over the past year.

Under a stepped up Course B, the actions that might feasibly be
undertaken by the Department of State are limited in scope. The
Department would continue to invest political capital in courses of
action designed to weaken, isolate and eventually effect the downfall
of the Castro Government whenever it reasonably appeared that the
benefits from each course of action would outweigh the losses for
the free world. |

A stepped up Course B would appear to involve primarily an

increase in covert activities which might stimulate the creation of

OIWONOOD

|

)

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R IVOILITOd


organized internal resistance to the Castro Government. Of the
variety of such covert activities a program of systematic sabotage

warrants serious consideration. (Added note on page 4.)

It may be reasonably argued that a program of sabotage should
not be undertaken until an organized base of political opposition
already exists in Cuba. It may be equally persuasively argued, how-
ever, that a program of sabotage may contribute significantly to
the creation of such a base of political opposition. Since organized
political opposition does not now exist in Cuba, a program of
sabotage may prove to be the means of developing one. This program
is visualized as three-fold: supply of sabotage materiel to Cubans
in Cuba who are not under U S. control; supply of sabotage materiel
and instructions. as to targets to Cubans in Cuba under our control;
and sabotage of targets by Cubans under our control who arrive
in Cuba, destroy the target, and withdraw from Cuba. Priority
should be given to targets of economic importance, the destruction
of which would result in the minimum possible loss of life.. Terroristic
acts of sabotage should be ruled out.

A second area of covert activities which might contribute to
the formation of organized opposition to the Castro Government is
that of improved techniques of propaganda beamed to the Cuban
people. Consideration should be given to seeking the establishment .
of a powerful, medium wave radio station in a friendly country on the
Caribbean perimeter, operated by selected Cuban refugees.

There follow a list of overt political and economic actions which
the Department of State might undertake under a stepped up Course B,
with advantages and disadvantages briefly noted where pertinent:

POLITICAL

A. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American
Republic's initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter -
American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises.

Advantage: Such action would continue to place the Cuban
problem in a multilateral context, thereby advancing the ''Hemis-
phere versus Cuba" impression.

Disadvantage: If poor judgment were exercised and an
inappropriate occasion chosen for OAS action, such action could
place on public display sharp division among the OAS member
states and could serve to weaken the inter-~-American system.

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FOP-SECRET
B. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the
diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments
and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government _
and urge them,. as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions

which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate
solidarity with the Cuban people.

Advantage: Continuance of this campaign, where success -
ful, would serve to isolate and weaken further the Castro Govern-
ment.

Disadvantage: If overdone, such a campaign could result
in other nations and peoples regarding the U.S. as immature
and neurotic with respect to the subject of Cuba, since, in
many instances, they do not regard the existence of the Castro
Government with the same degree of concern as does the U.S.

C. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to
prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba.

Advantage: This action would contribute to isolating Cuba
and reducing its capability of subversive activities in the
Hemisphere.

Disadvantage: Most Latin American nations do not have
legislation which provides for control over travel of its nationals
to specific countries. Attempts to obtain such legislation with
respect to travel to Cuba. could create serious local political
problems.

D. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any
indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge
significant anti-Castro/communist elements.

E. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S.
efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under
the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabi -
lities of countering Castro-communist threats to political stability
and orderly economic and social development.

F. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban
subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

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ECONOMIC

G. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in
the free world for Cuban exports.

Advantage: This action, where successful, would
.exacerbate Cuba's already precarious foreign exchange
position.and further reduce its ability to purchase vital
equipment in the free world.

Disadvantage: In some instances, Cuban exports are
less expensive than are similar products from alternate
sources. Under these circumstances, the U.S. might be
compelled to subsidize the alternate sources, an operation
for which funds are not currently available.

_H. Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the ship-
ment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources
to Cuba.

Added note on sabotage

Distinction should be made between major and dramatic sabotage
acts and those that might be characterized as irritants or harassment:
for example, complete destruction of oil refineries or power plants
as compared to temporary impairment of sugar refineries or cutting
of power lines. With respect to the first category, such acts should
not be isolated events but rather should be accompanied by other
actions in Cuba which might have resulted from the particular act
of sabotage or of which the act of sabotage might have been the result.
Acts of sabotage of the second category might be isolated events.

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7 August 1962

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Donald M. Wilson, USIA Representative for Operation Mongoose,
states:

Under stepped-up Course B there would be two psychological tasks:

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba, exposing the weak-
nesses and perfidies of the Castro/Communist regime.

2. Improve the informational capability throughout Latin America
to "isolate'' Castro/Communism and build up support for pro-democratic
Cuban elements.

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba.

—~T

a. Where other access is denied us, radio is the best means to reach
the Cuban people. It is USIA's view that our short wave capability (VOA)
is operating at the most efficient technical level, with nine hours of broad-
casting a day in Spanish. Three of the nine hours are devoted specifically
to Cuba, while the other six concern themselves with the rest of Latin
America. All are heard clearly in Cuba and will be heard much more
clearly in December, 1962, when our new transmitter in Greenville, North

Carolina, goes on the air.

"IVOIDO'TOHOASd

The establishment of a medium wave capability would be desirable.
It is indeed possible to broadcast a strong signal into Cuba, and USIA has
made a study of ten possible sites to locate transmitters (reported separately).
Our study also shows, however, that Castro has the ready capability to jam
our effort with an extraordinarily high percentage of success. Faced with
Castro's capability, should the U.S. undertake construction of a powerful
broadcasting facility at an estimated cost of eight million dollars and an
estimated building time of fifteen months? It is always possible that
Castro would not utilize his jamming capability and the U.S. would therefore
have a successful medium-wave operation into Cuba. Should an uprising
occur, the opportunities presented by such a U.S. medium-wave capability
would be great. Should there be an ultimate military action by the United
States, the opportunities of such a capability would also be great. However,
if none of these contingencies occur, we will have an expensive operation
on our hands with small listenership to show for it.

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DECLASSIFIED BY USIA- Gory
MONTH “7_ DAY 2/ YEAR &Z.
AUTHORITY: £.0. 12958

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b. Balloon deliveries. This capability under CIA direction has been
discussed at a meeting of the Special Group and not acted upon. If activated,
USIA would participate in the preparation of the propaganda material.

c. Aircraft deliveries. Also a CIA project. USIA would participate
in the preparation of propaganda material.

d. Smuggling of printed materials. As the U.S. capability within Cuba
increases, there is an improving possibility of making propaganda material
available to the population. The desirability of this would have to be first
determined on the basis of security to the personnel involved. An increase
of printed material exposing weaknesses of the Castro regime would be
desirable, and USIA would participate in the preparation of that material.

.e. The greatest possible circulation to the ''worm" (gusano. libre)
theme within Cuba should be implemented. This is a CIA project. However
if it gains momentum, USIA will be able to pick it up for VOA exploitation
into Cuba and the rest of Latin America.

f. We would continue to attempt to find a suitable musical theme
that might stir the resistance forces in Cuba.

2. Improve the information capability throughout Latin America

Our capability will depend on the availability of funds. The Latin
American program was stepped-up 32 percent in Fiscal Year '62 and it
will be stepped-up. 26 percent more in Fiscal Year '63, so the availability

_of even more funds is a real problem.

Here are examples of current programming which could be augmented:

1) Radio. We could step up our production of packaged radio programs
for placement on radio stations throughout Latin America.

2) Cartoon Books. The Agency has done six anti-Castro cartoon books
(5 million copies) having a widespread impact over the area. This program
could be stepped-up.

3) Motion Pictures. The Agency has produced an animated film on Cuban
land reform theme and has two more films in the pipeline. An increased
production of films, although expensive, could be instituted.

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4) Television. Television reaches a growing audience in Latin America.
The Agency has done one TV "'Special"' on Castro, and has acquired others
from commercial producers. Currently the Agency is doing an anti-Communist
TV series which will document the methods and results of Castroism. Vast
new opportunities are available in this medium. For example, we could doa
puppet series to poke fun at Castro, a device with vast appeal to Latinos.

5) Books. Our book program has several good anti-Castro titles although
the circulation is small. We have already asked Congress for a supplemental
appropriation to distribute five million books next year in Latin America.

Some of these will have an anti-Castro theme.

6) Refugees. We could make an even greater use of the Cuban refugee
story through all media. For example, we could do more TV shorts on Cuban
refugees at work (in garages, driving taxis, clerking, and so on.) We could
more fully exploit the Negro defectors.

Following are some possibilities for new programming:

1. Contract for anti-Castro supplements to be printed and placed regularly
in Latin American newspapers.

2. Subsidize a troupe of Cuban dancers, musicals, singers in one big show
to tour Latin America. Ample talent is available among the refugees. Program
content can be worked into the performance, or there could be a statement on
the Cuban plight at intermission.

——~ 3. Organize a show by Cuban painters, cartoonists, sculptors on
'one theme -- perhaps the executions -- to be sent around Latin America.

4. Develop a speakers’ bureau throughout Latin America.to send
lecturers before all types of groups. Provide these lecturers with anti-
Castro giveaway materials and film slides.

5. Develop a series of hard-hitting exhibits on various anti-Castro
themes, and get them displayed in key locations all over Latin America.

It is USIA's view that the most effective information program in
Latin America must have a positive theme. That is why the majority of
our output is still devoted to support.of the Alliance for Progress. Our
anti-Castro output, being essentially negative in nature, still is relegated
to.a less important position. We believe this accent on the positive to be
most desirable and should there be an increase in anti-Castro material
we would believe it necessary to similarly increase our positive support
material for the Alliance for Progress.

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Advantages of Stepped-up Course B:

a. It would raise the hopes of the anti-Castro Cubans and check
their tendency to grow complacent and settle into U.S. ways.

b. It would tend to bring together the various Cuban anti-Castro
factions.

c. It would call forth the heightened attention of the rest of Latin
America to the Castro/Communist regime.

Disadvantages:

a. World opinion, particularly in Europe, would become suspicious
of "intervention." -

b. A higher noise level will be accompanied by a higher risk of
exposure of the program.

Anticipated Reaction to Stepped-Up Course B

World reaction to a heightened propaganda-political action campaign
against Castro would be significantly influenced by (a) the pace of the
intensification, (b) the degree of overt identification with the U.S., and
(c) the intensity of the Soviet propaganda response.

Assuming such a campaign were skillfully handled, however, we
believe public reaction abroad would not be damaging to U.S. interests

in any significant degree.

Latin America -

There has been increasing disenchantment with Castro throughout
Latin America since early 1961. There would not be widespread negative
reaction if our campaign were closely identified with a Cuban liberation
movement and directed solely at Cuba, not throughout the area generally.

An overt, clearly U.S. -inspired campaign would bring varied
reactions. Mexico, with its legalistic, moralistic approach to Castro,
might react strongly to any implied violation of Cuban sovereignty. The
press, however, would be less critical than the government. Brazil, Chile,
Bolivia, and possibly Ecuador, would deplore our action. Again, however,
the press and public would be less critical than their governments.

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Argentina is less predictable; probably the present regime would
be less critical than Frondizi would be.

Governmental and public opinion of the smaller countries in and
near the Caribbean would be with us. They feel the heat from Castro
most, and are most eager to see him out of the way. In this category

are Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and to a lesser degree
Panama, Nicaragua and Salvador. Colombia would be sympathetic to
us. The Betancourt regime in Venezuela is, of course, openly anti -
Castro; there would be hostility on the far left, however.

Western Europe

Assuming no sudden or dramatic moves which might alarm a war-
wary public opinion, European reaction would be mostly sympathetic.
The U.K., Germany, the Benelux, and center and right-wing elements
in France and Italy would be particularly sympathetic. Enthusiasm
would be restrained by the fact that European nations have benefited
economically by the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba. They would
dislike losing the market, which would be inevitable to some degree if
Castro fell.

Spain and Portugal, which feel a Latin affinity with Cuba no matter
who is in power there, would be critical despite their lack of ideological
sympathy with Castro. Public opinion in Sweden and Austria might be
moderately critical on moral grounds. The anti-Communist Finnish

public would be favorable, though the government would straddle.

Communists and fellow-travelers would be sharply critical. It is
unlikely, however, that they would stage demonstrations or make much
noise except perhaps in Italy.

Canada.

Canada, which has profited economically by U.S. -Cuban estrange -
ment, would be critical, pegging its criticism on lofty moral grounds.

Eastern Europe-Communist China

The Communist Bloc and Yugoslavia would, of course, be sharply
critical. There might be mass meetings; possibly some ''demonstrations"
outside American embassies. There would be an intensification of pro-
Castro, anti-U.S. propaganda, and probably new assurances of Soviet
support to Castro in the event of hostilities.

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Near East and South Asia

The most serious repercussions in this area would be in India where
Krishna Menon and his ilk would publicly condemn the U.S. and exploit
the situation as further justification for their general anti-American line
and the MIG purchases.

The extent of Indian reaction would depend in large measure on the
intensity of the Soviet reaction. If the latter were sufficiently severe,
U.S. -Indian relations could be damaged.

Reaction in Ceylon and Iraq would be similar to that of India.

There would be criticism by the pro-Nasser press in Egypt and
throughout the Arab world, but the UAR Government -- pleased with
its improved relations with the U.S. -- probably would remain silent.
The Pakistani press, unhappy about our aid to India, might use Cuban
developments as a peg for attacks on the U S. despite their lack of
ideological sympathy for Castro.

What little reaction might develop in Greece, Turkey and Iran
would be mostly favorable.

Africa

Africa, like India, is particularly sensitive to any heating up of the
Cold War. If Moscow's response is particularly vigorous, African
political and opinion leaders are likely to become more skittish with a

_resulting slowdown in the pursuit of U.S. objectives in Africa.

The hostile neutrals (Casablanca Powers) would lead the negative
reaction. It is unlikely we would suffer much except in Guinea (where
Sekou Toure's disillusionment with the Communists might be slowed)
and Ghana. Even in these countries, however, it is not probable that
U.S. interests would be seriously damaged.

The independent and pro-Western nations (Monrovia Powers) would
be neutral or quietly sympathetic except in the case of Nigeria where we
might expect some hostility.

1

Far East

Except for the Philippines, Far Eastern nations have little interest
in Cuba. The Philippines, with their historic and cultural ties with Cuba,
would take note of events but not unsympathetically; they don't like Castro.

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~ . :
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Little notice would be taken in neutral Cambodia and Burma. The
Sukarno regime might criticize us, but the Indonesian public would
be indifferent. Communists and fellow-travelers might stage
demonstrations in Indonesia and Japan, but with little effect.

Communist China, North Korea and North Viet Nam would, of
course, exploit the situation in their broadcasting, but the impact
would be little different than that caused by their current anti-U.S.
propaganda.

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