Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba (Operation MONGOOSE)

2025 Release under the President John
F. Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

Date : 04/23/99
. Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : DOS
RECORD NUMBER : 179-10003-10023
RECORDS SERIES : COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : LOT 66D501

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM :
TO : SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)
TITLE : CONSEQUENCES OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
DATE : 08/08/62
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE

CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1C , .
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/26/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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Withdrawal No. —lt-alo WENA etal No.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

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" 8 AUG 1669

Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation
MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation
MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special
Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement
is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention
(in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment),
effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a require-
ment for sustained occupation, the level of national mobili-
gation required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to
this request, the requirement has been divided into its
separate parts.

2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment)

a. In order to seize control of key strategic areas in
Cuba {within 10-15 days with minimum casualties to both
sides about 261,000 US military personnel] would participate
in the operation.

b. About (71,000 army and 35,000 Marine forces| will be
engaged on the ground within Cuba. In addition, approxi-
mately {29,000 Army troops| will be available as on-call
forces,

e. Major units involved in the initial assault include:
(Two Army airborne divisions, an infantry brigade, and an

armored combat command; one and one-third Marine division/

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wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together
with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter

squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons, |
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ad. Principal equipment includes:

(1) Army - Artillery units and armoz|(ineluding about

8
Fa 275 tanks a)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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(2) Marines - Artillery units and armor ((including
about 85 tanks), plus some 320 supporting aircraft.

(3) Navy - Approximately (175=200 ships}, including
(two aircraft carriers| with approximately [180 aircraft
embarked)

(4) Air Force - About 490 troop carriers and trans-
ports, 312 tactical fighters, and 65 reconnaissance
and refuelling\ aircraft.

3. Level of National Mobilization Required.

a. Army ~ None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs
units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not
trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil
Affairs/Military Government operations,

b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift,(no rise in
mobilization level would be required] beyond the present
authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter
shipping.

ce. Air Force - In order to land the maximum number of
(airborne troops in the minimum time, fourteen Air Force
Reserve troop carrier squadrons (C-119) were originally
included in the airlift plan,| however, CINCLANT and USAF
have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving
any mobilization prior to D-day.

d. Marines - None.

e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent
political or military situation exists which would make such
a precaution desirable in order to assure US military
responsiveness to additional demands.

4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic

contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic
areas in Cuba( within 10-15 days. Subsequent to gaining such .
control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal |

of forces as the situation permits.

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ae When the assault forces have been committed to the
Cuban operation, the strategic Army forces in CONUS would
be short the sunporting forces for the remaining \Pive divi-
sions} It is estimates that[the army Airborne two Jivision
force| soulc be available for other operations 15-30 days af-
ter with’raval from Cuba. Substantisl Army forces’
from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forcés .
and remain on the islans to perform counterguerrilla opere-
tions anc conduct military government activities. This force
will be progressively with¢rawn as the new Cuban government
increases in effectiveness.

b. The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop lift capability
(less that deployed with the Sixth Fleet) will be engaged
fully during the initial phase of the operation. There may
be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapids redeployment
and counterguerrilla activity until order has been restored.
It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available
for other commitments within approximately 30-45 days. About

(40 to 50 per cent \of the\Pacific amphibious troop, 1ift|capa-
bility will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of
Cuba. These ships would be available for other operations in
the Pacific\about 15 days after the withdrawal of the Pacific
Marines from Cuba. In addition to the amphibious troop lift
capability the initial requirements for sealift will include
MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration.
Over~all requirements for shipping will diminish after the
initial 10-20 days of the operation.

c. It is estimated that combat-ready status of the Atlantic
Command Marine division/wing, team will be restored within 15
days of withdrawal; combat-readiness of the| Pacific Command
Marine expeditionary brigade] within 30 days of withdrawal.

d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift
would be fully committed.

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e. CONAD air defense capabilities in southeast United
"States will be augmented by the additional Naval and Air
Force forces brought into the area for this operation. There-
fore, no redeployment of CONAD forces from other areas is
anticipated.

5. Castro-Cuban Counteraction.

a. The military reaction will be determined in large
measure by the will of the Cuban armed forces to resist, as
well as by the weapons available to them and their proficiency
in their use, at the time of US military intervention.

b. The military capabilities of Cuba are oriented
primarily toward defensive activities. Cuban plans are
believed to contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed
by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally
by protracted guerrilla warfare.

ec, Cuba has about 50 MIG fighters, some of which may be
configured for carrying light bombs. Any of these that
survive the US air strikes could be used offensively against
targets in Florida. Also they have 11 B-26 aircraft some of
which, if they survive the air strikes by US forces, could
attempt to attack targets in the southeastern United States,
All forces engaged in the operation, as well as the
Continental Air Defense forces, however, would be alert to
guard against any such attempts at retaliation.
| d. In the future the Castro-Cuban capability for counter-
action will improve if Soviet's continue to provide the
Cubans with additional military equipment and training.

Thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist
government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly

increasing capabilities.

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6. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation.

a. The dyration of a US military presence in Cuba is
contingent upon such factors as the will of Castro-Cuban
forces to resist invasion, the degree of popular support
a defeated Castro might receive for the conduct of residual
guerrilla operations, and time required to reconstitute an
effective friendly Cuban government.

b. Following the establishment of essential military
control of the island, a substantial US military commitment
may be required in Cuba for a significant period of time.

Post assault tasks will include restoration ef law and
order and the conduct of counterguerrilla operations.

ec. To achieve the objectives of subparagraph b above,
it is planned that the post assault military presence
initially will consist of substantial Army follow-on
forces with such other sea and air support as may be required,
This will be reduced gradually in size as the effectiveness of
the new Cuban government increases. Thereafter, a lengthy

period of providing military assistance is anticipated.

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